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Abstract 
The Citizens Election Fund, Connecticut’s version of a clean elections law, was established in 2005 in the wake of 
the corruption scandal during the administration of Governor John Rowland. Modeled after the public financing 
systems of Maine and Arizona, Connecticut’s law has been touted as the most comprehensive in the nation. 
Scholars have hypothesized that states with public funding of campaigns have more competitive elections (Werner 
& Mayer, 2007). This paper will address whether the introduction of the Citizens’ Election Program has increased 
the level of electoral competition by specifically focusing on state house seats in Connecticut during the 2008 and 
2010 election cycles. Contestation for seats in the Connecticut General Assembly is a particularly salient issue due 
to the fact that many seats typically go unchallenged and as Mayer (2007) observed “a seat in the Connecticut 
House or Senate had become one of the safest offices anywhere, approaching if not exceeding the security of 
membership in the U.S. Congress.” The findings suggest that the hypothesized positive relationship between 
public financing and electoral competition show mixed results. After the introduction of the Citizens’ Election 
Program, the number of uncontested seats decreased slightly with more challengers emerging to contest 
incumbents in the 2008 and 2010 election cycles. While some positive effects are seen by the 2010 election cycle 
with the margin of votes cast for winners narrowing in 41% of house races, the vast majority of house incumbents 
continue to win and do so by larger vote margins. Finally, the overall reelection rate for incumbents remained 
largely unchanged. Further research with a longer time horizon that is inclusive of more state house elections will 
have to be conducted before any firmer conclusions can be drawn regarding the efficacy of the Citizens’ Election 
Program.  




The year 2004 was a tumultuous one in Connecticut state government. Revelations of graft and corruption led to 
the resignation of Governor John Rowland. In the wake of the scandal, the Connecticut General Assembly adopted 
the most comprehensive public election finance system in the country. While Maine and Arizona’s clean election 
laws predated that of Connecticut’s by several years, Connecticut’s program was the most sweeping in terms of its 
scope. Unlike its counterparts in other states whose clean election laws provided partial funding for select public 
offices, Connecticut’s law established full financing for all state offices (Nyart, 2006). In addition, Connecticut 
was also the only state to adopt the law via the legislative process whereas Maine and Arizona had enacted their 
programs through a ballot initiative. Sensing the public outrage and appetite for reform, state legislators prepared 
to tackle the issue directly. 
The moniker “clean elections” has been applied to public funding of campaigns since its inception in Arizona in 
2000. (Note 1) Among the ascribed benefits of public funding for election campaigns are: lowering the barriers to 
entry for emergent candidates, broadening the pool of candidates in terms of ideological and geographic diversity, 
reducing the incumbency advantage, and controlling campaign costs (Mayer, Werner, & Williams, 2005). Relative 
newcomers to the political process who would ordinarily have a difficult time raising funds and might otherwise be 
discouraged from running would now have the necessary financial support to mount a viable campaign against an 
incumbent. Critics, on the other hand, deride public financing as little more than an incumbent protection act 
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arguing that it does little more than to solidify the advantage of incumbents and effectively handicap challengers 
who must abide by set spending levels (Fahle, 2009).  
1.2 
Clean elections laws have been heralded by proponents as a panacea for a variety of ills including government 
corruption and lethargic electoral competition. The major assumption underlying the removal of private money in 
campaigns is that it would lessen corruption. Legislators would no longer be beholden to the special interest groups 
that once funded their election campaigns. Additional theorized benefits include the impact on electoral 
competition. Challengers, traditionally at a disadvantage to incumbents due to the fundraising factor, would be 
induced to run for office. The removal of special interest money as well as the emergence of newcomers to public 
office are both viewed as positive outcomes for electoral democracy. Since the advent of public financing for 
campaigns in Minnesota in the early 1990s, more than twenty states have adopted some version of a clean elections 
law (Brickner, 2008). 
Despite the initial enthusiasm for clean election laws among reformers, some scholars are less sanguine about the 
purported benefits of clean elections. For instance, Mayer, Werner and Williams (2005) assert that much of the 
fanfare surrounding public funding programs is unwarranted by arguing that reforms have largely been adopted in 
the absence of studies that document their efficacy. In fact, until recently: “the elements of clean elections, funding 
amounts, eligibility rules, and spending limits are based more on guesswork than solid evidence.” (2005, p. 3)  
1.3 
With an increasing number of states adopting clean elections laws since then, scholars have filled the empirical 
void that has largely preceded policy adoption in earlier years and have conducted studies which measure the 
effects of public financing programs. In a multi-state study that included Maine, Arizona, Minnesota, Hawaii and 
Wisconsin spanning the years from 1998-2004, Mayer, Werner and Williams (2005) found that public funding 
induced challengers to emerge and increased the pool of candidates thereby increasing the chances for competitive 
races in all states but Hawaii and Wisconsin. They also found that the reelection rates for incumbents in Maine and 
Arizona decreased. However, they were cautious about attributing this to public funding. (p. 20). As an important 
caveat to their results, Hawaii and Wisconsin were found not to have experienced positive effects from their clean 
election programs. The grants comprised only a small fraction of the candidates’ total funds which included private 
sources of funding and thus did not have an appreciable impact on electoral outcomes. Similarly, Mayer and Wood 
(1995) that public funding had no appreciable impact on electoral competition in Wisconsin from 1964-1990. 
Another important finding which emerged from Mayer et al’s (2005) study is that the design of public financing 
programs does matter. Grant amounts that are either too generous or too stingy may inhibit candidate emergence 
and competitiveness. (2005, p. 22) The sensitivity of election results to program design was also noted by Donnay 
and Ramsden (1995) who observed “that public funding can considerably help a challenger’s campaign but it must 
be tempered with the knowledge that public financing also helps incumbents” (p. 362). Hence, their study included 
a dichotomous variable to measure whether the incumbent and challenger both accept public funds and how this 
would impact their respective vote shares. Put differently, the design of public finance systems such as grant size 
creates incentives or disincentives that political actors respond to in deciding whether to accept public funding. 
Finally, drawing parallels between Maine and Arizona in order to speculate about the impact of clean elections in 
Connecticut, Mayer anticipated that elections will become more competitive in Connecticut due to the Citizens’ 
Election Program and what many viewed as a particularly generous grant amount relative to other states. Noting 
the unusually uncompetitive environment, Mayer (2007) predicted that “the generous grant levels will give 
challengers, in particular, access to an unprecedented level of resources. We find it difficult not to believe that 
doubling the average amount of challenger spending will have a major effect on competition.” (p. 23) 
These studies shed considerable light on the design and implementation of clean election laws in other states. To 
the knowledge of this author, no statistical studies have been conducted which measure the impact of 
Connecticut’s Citizens’ Election Program on electoral competition. This study seeks to fill this void with an 
analysis of Connecticut’s house races in the 2008 and 2010 election cycles. While the program was touted in a 
program evaluation as a “A Novel System with Extraordinary Results” (SEEC, 2011) by the agency charged with 
the task of implementing the program, this study aims to determine whether such a view is warranted. In the 
section that follows, a brief overview of the legislative history surrounding the passage of the clean elections law in 
Connecticut will be followed by data and findings from the 2006, 2008 and 2010 election cycles to test the 
hypothesized relationship between public funding and electoral competition. 
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The political landscape in Connecticut pre-CEP: A “sclerotic” (Note 2) electoral system 
Rowland’s corruption scandal and subsequent resignation from office in 2004 hastened the passage of the Act 
Concerning Comprehensive Reform for Statewide Constitutional and General Assembly Offices. Reformers such 
as Common Cause had spent a decade attempting to move the issue onto the legislative agenda to no avail (Nyart, 
2006). The Rowland corruption scandal was the catalyst that propelled the issue of campaign finance reform to the 
forefront of the policy agenda.  
The primary goal of the program is to eliminate the influence of special interest money in Connecticut politics. A 
secondary goal of the program seeks to increase electoral competition, which is a particularly salient issue given 
the political landscape in Connecticut. The incumbency advantage, reinforced by legislative districting, has 
gradually accrued to Democrats. Lockard (1959) observed that until 1959, there was close party competition in 
Connecticut with Republicans holding the advantage in terms of seats in the General Assembly. In fact, for much 
of the 20th century, until the apportionment revolution in the 1960’s and 1970s, the State House in Connecticut had 
been dominated by Republicans (Lockard, 1959). With the greater weight that reapportionment gave the 
traditionally-Democratic urban centers, the Connecticut state house has been under Democratic control for all but 
two of the last thirty five years. As Rose observed (2007), “From 1987 to 2005, the Democrats on average have 
occupied 62 percent of the seats, a most comfortable margin of power.” (p. 60). The Connecticut scenario, while 
more pronounced than other states, is illustrative of larger national trends which saw the routine reelection of 
incumbents. In fact, 95% of incumbents in state houses across the country have been reelected since 1996 (Mayer 
& Werner, 2008). Mayer also found that in tandem with the incumbency advantage and perhaps reinforcing it is 
the increase in the number of uncontested seats. In contrast to the 1970s when almost every seat in the Connecticut 
General Assembly was challenged, by 2006 that number had shrunk to 58% of House incumbents who faced an 
opponent (2007, 14). Rose (2007) noted that:  
In the 2004 state legislative elections, 82 percent of seats in the state house of representatives were either 
uncontested by one of the major political parties, or won by a margin of 10 or more percentage points. Of those 
house seats in either the uncontested or “safe” category, 68 percent were held by Democrats. (p. 61).  
Moreover, incumbents who did face challengers during this time period were not in competitive contests, defined 
as those in which the incumbent receiving less than 60% of the vote. 
As Mayer (2007) observed:  
Our chief finding is that the electoral environment in Connecticut has changed in the last decade, 
moving from a period of sustained competition that had lasted since the 1930s, to one of the least 
competitive electoral systems in the country. Beginning in the late 1980s, legislative elections became 
increasingly one-sided affairs. By 2000, a seat in the Connecticut House or Senate had become one the 
safest offices anywhere, approaching if not exceeding the security of membership in the U.S. Congress. 
We are unable to tie this development to any single causal factor, but likely culprits include the 
increasing professionalization of the legislature, the creation of safe districts through redistricting, and 
challengers’ inability to raise sufficient funds. (p. 3) 
Legislative professionalization may also contribute to the incumbency advantage as incumbents view the trappings 
of office as being increasingly more attractive thus making retaining their seats becomes more important. All of 
these three factors have converged to create an uncompetitive political system. 
Timing is Everything 
Passage of the Citizens’ Election Program occurred after a lengthy debate in the House and Senate. On November 
30, 2005, a special session was called to deliberate Emergency Certification Senate Bill 2103. The public financing 
of elections provision of the bill was part of an omnibus package of legislation that contained various provisions 
including a ban on contributions from lobbyists and state contractors. Upon introducing the bill, Representative 
Caruso (126th district), the chief architect of the bill, spoke of the fifteen years to bring the issue of campaign 
finance reform to the agenda by commenting that the “stars are aligned with this legislation” (p. 8). The issue was 
ripe for consideration and as Nyart (2006) observed “the combination of a corruption-ridden political environment 
and pressure from the grassroots had created a situation in which the Governor and Democratic legislative leaders 
all wanted to be seen as strong advocates for reform” (2006, 5). When Governor Jodi Rell took office in 2005, she 
made campaign finance reform the centerpiece of her administration. Cognizant of the fact that Republicans had 
typically not favored reform, she convened a group of Democrats to begin work on crafting a bill to which various 
objections were made by Republican legislators during deliberations. Republican lawmakers lodged major 
objections ranging from the procedural to the substantive. From a procedural perspective, they derided the measure 
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for being passed without their input. Some recounted the rapidity with which the bill was moved through the 
legislature with only twenty four hours to review the bill. Apart from the procedural objections, some legislators 
addressed the substance of the bill which in their view did not fully address the issue of special interest money. A 
major source of disagreement was the provision that replaced special interest PACs with political action 
committees controlled by legislative leaders or political caucuses (Representative Ward, Final Senate Debate, 
November 30, 2005, p. 13). By allowing such PACs to spend money on behalf of house and senate races of their 
choosing, critics derided this as a major loophole in the legislation. Representative Miner (66th district) offered the 
following regarding the major shortcomings of the legislation: 
I heard the Chairman say that the stars are aligned, and I think he’s right. I think the stars are aligned. I think people 
are going to grasp at this Bill and they’re going to support this because the public believes that something good is 
going to come out of it. And that whatever corruption may have existed in the past is going to mysteriously go 
away. Right now people have to disclose where the money comes from. Everybody that writes a check to you or 
me has to disclose who they are, what they’re giving, where they live. What this is going to do is it’s going to force 
money into other areas and it’s going to come back in in-kind services that I don’t think anybody is going to track. 
I don’t know if anybody is going to know whether the individual hired by the minority leader’s PAC is working for 
you or me or anybody else. (p. 66) 
Another major stumbling block to the bill raised by Republicans was the use of taxpayers’ money to fund election 
campaigns. Still others questioned the inherent constitutionality of efforts to regulate campaign contributions as 
infringing on free speech. With respect to the first objection, proponents of the bill argued that the financing of 
election campaigns through taxes was superior to the system of continuing to allow special interests to contribute 
to campaigns. The removal of special interest money from campaigns was to have a sanitizing effect that would not 
only free up candidates’ time from having to raise money but afford them greater independence once in office and 
not be beholden to the special interests that helped get them elected. Opponents of the bill pointed out that while 
PACs could no longer contribute to campaigns, there were still loopholes in the law that would enable these groups 
to circumvent the law.  
Finally, fiscal conservatives found the use of taxpayers’ money to fund campaigns objectionable. The Citizens’ 
Election Fund would require roughly twenty million dollars a year to operate and would be financed largely 
through escheats or unclaimed property. It would also create a new agency, the Citizens’ Election Enforcement 
Commission, to administer the program. Despite the objections, the bill passed along largely partisan lines with a 
vote of 27-8 in the Senate and 82-65 in the House. Public Act 05-5 officially established the Citizens’ Election 
Program whose goals are five-fold: 1) increase voter choice, 2) increase electoral competition, 3) increase voter 
participation, 4) reduce special interest group influence, and 5) curb campaign cost increases. This paper will focus 
on the second goal of increasing electoral competition. The program, as set forth in chapter 157 of the Connecticut 
General Statutes, provides voluntary, public financing to qualified candidates including all statewide offices as 
well as the General Assembly. To qualify, state house candidates must meet two thresholds: raise $5,000 through 
small individual donations ranging from $5-100 and obtain 150 signatures of residents in their districts (CEP, 
2009). In return for foregoing private funding, state house candidates who participate in the Citizens’ Election 
Program receive a $25,000 grant. In addition the five thousand dollars which they have raised to qualify for the 
grant, candidates must abide by this spending limit and agree to use their funds only on permissible campaign 
expenditures as regulated by the CEP. 
Since 2005, Connecticut’s clean election law joins the ranks of other states that have similar programs notably 
Arizona and Maine, whose program design most closely resembles that of Connecticut. The citizens of Maine and 
Arizona passed clean election laws by ballot initiatives in 1996 and 1998, respectively. Participating candidates in 
Arizona must raise $5 contributions from 220 citizens from their district. Upon reaching this threshold they qualify 
for a $21, 479 grant. (CCEC, 2010). Given the similarity of Connecticut’s clean election law with those of Arizona 
and Maine, campaign finance scholars Mayer and Williams (2008) expect that we should see a similarly salutary 
effect on electoral competition. The data and methods section below discuss the finding draw from house races 
between the years 2006 -2010. 
2. Methods 
This paper will attempt to answer whether there is an appreciable difference in electoral competition by measuring 
the election results before and after the introduction of the Citizens’ Election Fund. To what extent, if any, has the 
program increased the level of competition in state house elections and altered the political landscape in 
Connecticut? To address these questions, this study will analyze data from state house races in the 2006, 2008 and 
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2010 election cycles to compare trends in pre and post-reform periods. A database was constructed utilizing data 
drawn from the Secretary of State’s Office and the State Elections Enforcement Commission in Connecticut. 
There are a variety of possible metrics to capture electoral competition. This paper will utilize those employed by 
Mayer, Werner and Williams (2005) which are as follows: 
1) The percentage of incumbents who faced a major party opponent (contestedness),  
2) the percentage of incumbents who were in a competitive race, defined as one in which the winner received 
less than 60% of the two-party vote (competitiveness) 
3) the percentage of incumbents who ran and were reelected to office (reelection rate) 
3. Results 
One of the desired outcomes or measures of effectiveness for public campaign financing laws is their purported 
positive effect on electoral competition. Historically in Connecticut, many house seats go unchallenged due to the 
incumbency advantage. This has been an increasing trend since the 1980s (McKee 1983) in which Democrats have 
held a majority of the seats in the General Assembly for all put two of the last thirty years.  
A cursory review of the data reveals that one positive effect that public funding seems to have is on the number of 
uncontested seats in the House and Senate. The number of uncontested seats in the General Assembly declined by 
10% from 2008 to 2010 (Secretary of State, 2010). In the house, 48 out of 151 seats went uncontested as compared 
to 2008 with 53 going unchallenged. Contestation appears to be greater overall for state senate seats with only 6 
out of 36 seats going unchallenged (Secretary of State, 30). However, upon further examination of the data, 
contestation levels appear to have returned to roughly the same level during the pre-CEF period when 43 out of 151 
or 28.5% of seats went unchallenged. 
State House Races 
Year Uncontested by One of the Major Parties Percentage 
1998   43 out of 151 28.5% 
2000   60 out of 151 40.4% 
2002  50 out of 151 33.1% 
2004   60 out of 151 40.4% 
2006  62 out of 151 41% 
2008   53 out of 151 35% 
2010   48 out of 151 31.8% 
Secretary of State, Press Release June 28, 2010 
While it may be tempting to attribute increased contestation to the introduction of the Citizens’ Election Fund, the 
data above do not warrant such a conclusion. Candidate emergence is usually affected by several factors one of 
which may be public funding. As Mayer and Wood note (1995), “challengers consider the overall strategic 
environment, and not just the question of fundraising, when making the initial decision to run.” (1995, 69) Other 
factors that weigh into a candidate’s decision are district competitiveness and the experience and background of 
the challenger. 
A more reliable gauge of electoral competition would be the percentage of incumbents who were in a competitive 
race. It is possible to draw some inferences by examining the percentage of the vote share for each candidate. 
When both candidates have opted to utilize public funds and thereby establishing a level playing field between 
candidates, one would expect that the introduction of public funding into a race will erode an incumbent’s vote 
share over time. Effectively, it means that both candidates will have to abide by the same rules and spending limits. 
On the other hand, others have argued that spending limits institutionalize the incumbents’ advantage.  
Comparison of 2006, 2008 and 2010 Election Cycles 
During the inaugural run of the Citizens Election Program in 2008 there was no appreciable difference in the 
percentage of uncontested House races. In fact, uncontested House seats increased slightly between 2006 and 2008 
from 40 to 46. From the vantage point of participation in the Citizens’ Election Program, the 2008 election cycle 
was a success with 73% of General Assembly candidates participating in the program. Incumbents appeared to 
benefit the most from CEP with 78% having won reelection utilizing public funds (CEP, 2009). Only six 
incumbents lost their seats which translated into a five percent increase in the success rate of challengers.  





Table 1. Indicators for voter choice and electoral competition 
CANDIDATES SENATE HOUSE BOTH CHAMBERS
2006 2008 2006 2008 2006 2008
Total Candidates and District Races 
Total number of 
candidates 69 70 281 273 350 343 
Total races 36 36 151 151 187 187 
Incumbents 
Incumbents 32 32 139 131 171 163 
Incumbents who 
won 32 31 133 125 165 156 
Challengers (candidate facing incumbent) 
Challengers  27 28 116 103 143 131 
Challengers who 
won 0 1 6 6 6 7 
Minor party or petitioning candidates 
Minor party or 
petitioning 
candidates 6 7 39 32 45 39 
Minor party or 
petitioning 
candidates who 
won 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Uncontested races 
Uncontested races 6 7 40 46 46 53 
Open seat races (no incumbent running) 
Open seat races  4 4 12 20 16 24 
Average number of candidates per district 
Average number of 
candidates per 
district 1. 92 1. 94 1. 86 1. 81 1. 89 1. 88
OLR Research Report, February 9, 2009, State of Connecticut 
 
While incumbents still generally held onto their seats in 2008, the races were closer as seen in the narrowing of the 
vote margin. In the House, the average vote disparity decreased 33% in 2006 to 23.26% in 2008 (SEEC, 2009, p. 
27). 
2010 State House Elections 
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During the second election cycle in 2010, 70% of the total General Assembly candidates participated in the 
Citizens Election Program, roughly the same amount as in 2008. There was a slight improvement in the prospects 
of challengers with the vote disparity among competitive house races decreasing from 23% in 2008 to 18% in 2010. 
A total of 11 incumbents lost their seats in state house. However, it is not clear that the CEP accounted for a greater 
number of incumbents losing their seats. The strategic environment in 2010 was decidedly different than 2008. 
The General Assembly elections in Connecticut coincided with midterm elections in Congress. Dissatisfaction 
with the national economy and the Republican tide that swept many incumbents from office elsewhere may have 
had a spillover effect in Connecticut.  
In order to draw firmer conclusions regarding the efficacy of CEP, further statistical tests will be conducted in 
order to consider other variables that may account for increased electoral competition such as the overall strategic 
and electoral environment. 
Table 2. Citizens' election program: participation during 2008 election cycle 
 
SENATE HOUSE BOTH 
CHAMBERS
Total Candidates 
Total number of legislative candidates 70 273 343 
Candidates who won (equal to number of 
districts) 36 151 187 
Participating Candidates 
Participating candidates 55 195 250 
Participating candidates who received 
grant* 51 184 235 
Participating candidates who won 32 114 146 
Participating Incumbents 
Participating incumbents 29 101 130 
Participating incumbents who won 28 95 123 
Participating Challengers 
Participating challengers 20 64 84 
Participating challengers who won 1 6 7 
Participating Minor Party or Petitioning candidates 
Participating minor party or petitioning 
candidates 2 7 9 
Participating minor party or petitioning 
candidates who received grant* 1 4 5 
Participating minor party or petitioning 
candidates who won 0 0 0 
Participating Open Seat Candidates  
Participating open seat candidates 2 15 17 
Participating open seat candidates who 
won 2 14 16 
OLR Research Report, February 9, 2009, State of Connecticut 




Several metrics are utilized to capture the relevance of other dimensions of the reach of the elections law 
specifically the following:  
(i) Change in the margin of victory for each particular state house race, both in absolute terms and as a percent of 
the total vote. It is hypothesized that the increased competition brought about by public funding would reduce 
the margin of victory as measured by both metrics. 
(ii) Electoral races are considered competitive if the incumbent receives less than 60% of the vote. The electoral 
law should increase competitiveness.  
(iii) Another measure of competitiveness is the total number of votes cast by the opposition. The electoral law 
should result in an increase in the number of votes cast by the opposition. 
(iv) Party diversity is considered a desirable outcome and is measured by the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index of 
Concentration (HHI) which looks at the share of party presence in the various races and also at the share of 
total votes garnered by each party. The HHI is a sample statistics and therefore its sampling variance can be 
calculated. Formally, the index is calculated as follows: 
HHI = 1000*∑ ݏ݅௡௜                                         (1) 
Where: Si is the relevant share of the either party presence or share of votes. The higher the index the less diversity 
is present. The maximum is HHI = 10,000, representing a one party outcome.  
The data on the realized value of these other metrics are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 3.  
Metric 2006 2008 2010 
Average Winning Margin of Races (Levels) 3142 4352 2297 
Winning Margin of Votes Cast (% of total 
votes cast) 57.5% 54.8% 41.0% 
Competitive Vote Margin (is the average 
outcome less than or equal to 60%?) 60.0% 55.0% 71.5% 
Total Number of Votes Cast by Opposition 233,864 361,352 367,999  
Diversity Index of Opposition (Herfindahl on 
Share of Party Presence in the Various Races) 3588 3562 3995 
Diversity Index of Opposition (Herfindahl on 
Share of Votes Garnered by Party) 5844 5402 5849 
 
Table one demonstrates that the average winning margins decreased in 2010 over the two previous elections in 41% 
of state house races. However, in those races where incumbents won, they were much less competitive overall with 
incumbents garnering 71.5% of the vote. 
Results: Additional Metrics 
Procedurally the same method is used gain with the addition of permutation methods to test the hypothesis and to 
generate p-values. The results are presented in Table 2. 
Few of the metrics exhibit statistically significant change between the 2006 and 2008 election cycle. Thus, the 
observed improvement in the winning margin of votes cast as a percent of total votes cast is not statistically 
significant. The same findings emerge for the two diversity indexes estimated. Second, there is discernible change 
in the metrics between 2006 and 2008 that is contrary to what one would expect – but the change is not statistically 
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significant. For example, there is an increase in the average winning margin (levels) of votes between 2006 and 
2008 (from 3142 votes to 4352) rather than the anticipated decrease.  
Table 4.  
Metric 2006-08 2006-10 
Change in the Average Winning 
Margin of Voters 1,209   (845) 
p-value (0.561) (0.487) 
Difference in the Winning Margin of 
Votes Cast (% of total votes cast)  (0.03) (0.17) 
p-value (0.657) (0.0417)* 
Difference in the Competitive Vote 
Margin (is the average outcome less 
than or equal to 60%) (0.05) 0.12  
p-value (0.053) (0.0017)* 
Change in the Total Number of 
Votes Cast by Opposition 127,488  134,135  
p-value (0.031)* (0.0432)* 
Change in the Diversity Index of 
Opposition (Herfindahl on Share of 
Party Presence in the Various Races) (27) 407  
p-value (0.671) (0.450) 
Change in the Diversity Index of 
Opposition (Herfindahl on Share of 
Votes Garnered by Party) (442) 5  
p-value (0.759) (0.562) 
 
There are more significant changes in the comparison with the 2010 election cycle. But the results are 
contradictory. Positive improvements in the winning margin of votes cast are found but also a deterioration of 
competitive vote margin. Incumbents continue to win with larger margins. Both are statistically significant. 
Importantly, the party diversity indexes show no statistically discernible improvement at all, whether from the 
comparison to the 2008 or the 2010 cycle. A somewhat troubling indicator is the fact that party and opposition 
diversity appears to have deteriorated by 2010 when compared to the party and opposition layout present in the 
2006 election, although the difference is not statistically meaningful.  
4. Discussion 
The results examining the impact of the Citizens’ Election Program on electoral competition are mixed: some 
metrics do suggest statistically meaningful differences whereas many others do not. Hardly any statistically 
significant results are evident in the 2008 cycle. With token exceptions, all of the minute differences observed, 
when they are in fact observed, occur by the 2010 election cycle.  
Ironically, a law aiming to enhance electoral competition strengthened the position of the Democrats in a robustly 
blue state: the results of several metrics appear to have given a slight edge to Democrats, at the expense of 
Republicans. Given the variance in the information provided by the assembled metrics it is difficult to conclude 
whether the public funding of elections in the State of Connecticut is an unqualified success, or for that matter, a 
qualified success. First, no one metric takes precedence over another. Second, any weighted combination of 
metrics must necessarily rely on subjective weights. Third, performance is essentially multidimensional: superior 
performance against one objective cannot easily be traded off against modest or inadequate performance on 
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another. Fourth, several of the proposed ‘success’ criteria may be specified inadequately. Fifth, and at any rate, 
`success’ in this instance refers to the performance of the chosen metrics. Put differently, the examination 
scrutinized instruments, not final outcomes. 
It should be clear that the lack of conclusive discernible effects is not evidence against the benefits of the 
Connecticut clean election law. The result may also be a consequence of low statistical power or that the existing 
law left several gaping loopholes. In fact, one could realistically argue that because of remaining porosity in the 
system the current law may not sufficiently curtail the privately-directed flow of funds to favored candidates. And 
given the presence of Citizens United it is not clear whether there can be any further tightening. Last, given the 
historical importance of local town and municipal elections in Connecticut a law aimed at alleviating the ills of the 
state electoral system may miss the well known point that all elections are local and that funding municipal 
elections may be as important to fostering electoral competition.  
Thus, no conclusions can be drawn regarding the efficacy of the law. It appears that with respect to the trial run of 
the Citizens’ Election Program, the jury is still out. Further research which is inclusive of more elections will have 
to be conducted before any one conclusion can be unambiguously drawn or the effusiveness and optimism of the 
various commentators supporting clean election laws can be fully substantiated. More time is needed to declare a 
victory for clean elections in Connecticut. 
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Note 1. Public grants in some states have been in existence since the 1970’s however the size of the grants were 
relatively small and often combined with other sources of private funding. The term clean elections is widely 
considered to have received its inauguration with the inception of the public funding program in Arizona which has 
been heralded as a model for other states. 
Note 2. Mayer and Williams (2007) used the term “sclerotic” to describe the nature of Connecticut’s electoral 
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